This paper puts forward new potential determinants of patent value which are mainly related to the identification of institutional sources of knowledge and the geographic scope of patenting strategy. The impact of these new indicators is evaluated through an empirical analysis that focuses on the number of forward citations received by 208 patent families applied for by six Belgian Universities. The new indicators provide a more in-depth view on the way non-patent citations, backward patent citations, co-assignees and the geographical scope for protection determine patent value. The policy implications induced by these results are the positive impact of collaboration between public research organisations and the need to focus on academic researchers with a high scientific profile in terms of publications in order to crystallize their tacit knowledge into high value academic patents. 
Introduction
Patent counts are increasingly used to measure innovation performances in technico-economic studies (see e.g., Griliches (1990) and Griliches et al. (1986) ). Patents are frequently used as an indicator of R&D output, as a vector of knowledge spillovers, as a tool to assess research direction or strategy, and as a macroeconomic indicator of technological performance. However, the simple patent counts provide a biased measure of the innovation performances (see Scherer and Harhoff, 2000) . On average, it is said that only one to three patents out of one hundred yield significant financial returns. This skewed distribution of patent value is at the origin of a small but burgeoning stream of economic research that attempts to identify the determinants of patent value.
This paper aims to contribute to this literature. Its main objective is to put forward, develop and validate new potential determinants of patent value. These new indicators consist of refined traditional ones (non-patent citations, backward patent citations, co-assignees and family size) obtained by formally identifying the institutional sources of knowledge.
In order to test the validity of the traditional and the new determinants of patent value, academic patents are focused on. Most of the existing literature focuses on business-related patent applications. In the present analysis, the sample is composed of 208 patent families applied for at the EPO (European Patent Office) by six Belgian universities.
This particular focus on academic patents finds its justification in the radical change observed in the patenting activity of Belgian universities since the early nineties. The number of patents has exploded since the late nineties, as witnessed by the filing of 142 patent families by the six universities, more than five times the number of patent families applied for during the late eighties. Beyond this revolution, the motivation in analysing academic patents is induced by the increasing role that policy-makers and corporations want academia to play in the knowledge society (e.g., Mansfield (1991 Mansfield ( , 1995 , Mansfield and Lee (1996) and Etzkowitz (1998) ).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature on patent value. The number of forward patent citations (the number of citations a patent receives from more recent patents) is generally identified as a major determinant of patent value. It reflects the effective use or the importance of the patented technology to new inventions. The other most important determinants are the family size (geographical scope for protection) and backward patent citations (the number of citations to previous patents; this illustrates the technological state of the art on which the patented technology relies). In the light of this literature, section 3 suggests four new sets of potential indicators of patent value. The database and descriptive statistics are presented in section 4. Section 5 is dedicated to the empirical implementation and defines the various models that are used to identify the value determinants of academic patents. The empirical results are presented and interpreted in section 6. The last section concludes and provides some policy implications.
The empirical results suggest that the new indicators related to the institutional sources of knowledge improve the understanding of what determines the value of patents. Using more qualitative variables instead of purely quantitative ones does indeed improve the fit. It seems that it is not the number of backward citations that matters, but what type of institution the patent is citing. It is not the number of co-assignees that matters, but the mix of institutions involved in developing the patent. It is not the number of non-patent citations that matters, but whose work the patent is using. It is not the number of family members that matters, but to where you are expanding geographical protections.
The literature on patent value
Most of the empirical analyses attempting to better understand the factors underlying the skewed distribution of patent value are described in table 1, and their results are summarized in table 2.
Several empirical strategies have been used to approximate the value of a patent. They rely on different datasets (e.g. all patent applications in a regional office; a particular sector such as biotech; a sample of firms in a given country), they cover various time spans and use different data sources. In addition, the functional forms of the empirical models vary from one study to the other. Some authors rely on the monetary value of each patent (Harhoff et al., 1999 (Harhoff et al., , 2003 or on the present value evaluated by experts on a value scale (Reitzig, 2003) , on forward patent citations (Lerner, 1994) , on a composite indicator (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1999) , on the probability to get a patent granted (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000) , on patent opposition and renewal data Simpson, 1989, Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997) , and on whether a high-tech start-up has been created or not on the basis of the codified invention (Shane, 2001) . As a matter of fact, there are as many potential methodologies to approximate the value of patent as the number of existing investigations.
Similarly, the type and number of explanatory variables that have been used as determinants of patent value are heterogeneous across studies. Table 2 shows that the most frequently used determinants are the number of forward patent citations (when it is not used as a dependent variable), the number of backward patent citations and the geographical scope for protection (number of countries in the patent family). Other variables rely on the concepts of opposition procedures, renewal data 1 , application scope (the number of claims) and non-patent citations.
*** Insert table 1 around here *** Despite this strong heterogeneity across studies, some similarities emerge. The most important one is probably the fact that the number of forward patent citations (FPC) is closely associated with the value of a patent. All studies using forward patent citations reach this conclusion. In a similar vein, indicators of the geographical scope of protection of a patent (or family size) are closely related to patent value (see bottom line of table 2). Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) develop a composite quality index significantly related to the decisions to renewal and to oppositions. They point out that forward citations and family size are important determinants of renewal decisions, but the number of claims and the number of backward citations are not. In the field of Computed Tomography scanners, Trajtenberg (1990) finds a close correlation between indicators based on forward patent citations and independent measures of the social value of innovation in that field. Harhoff et al. (1999) also establish for a set of German patented inventions that patents with greater economic value are more likely to be cited in subsequent patents. Hall et al. (2000) highlight that "citation-weighted patent stocks are more highly correlated with market value than patent stocks themselves and that this fact is mainly due to the high value placed on firms that hold very highly cited patents" [Hall et al., 2000, abstract] .
A third indicator that has received substantial empirical validation is based on backward patent citations (BPC, the number of former patents cited by the inventors). Three out of six studies using this indicator found that it has a positive and significant impact on patent value. *** Insert table 2 around here *** Besides these three main indicators, the other potential determinants that have been incorporated in patent valuation models have either led to conflicting results or received very little empirical validation. The biggest bone of contention concerns the scope of the invention (approximated by the number of claims and/or the number of technological classes associated with the invention).
For instance, Lerner (1994) examines how patent scope affects the valuation of new biotechnology firms. The author finds that an increasing scope (measured by the number of four-digit IPC -International Patent Classification -classes into which patents are classified) of patent protection is associated with higher valuations. Focusing on MIT's patent applications, Shane (2001) also demonstrates that the scope, the radicalness and the importance of MIT's patents have a significant and positive impact on the probability to create new technology-based firms. However, the valuable impact of the patent scope is challenged by many authors, including Harhoff et al. (2003) , Harhoff and Reitzig (2002) , van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997) . Scope is sometimes inversely correlated with patent value, at least when measured with the number of listed technological classes.
Tong and Frame (1994) put forward the number of claims as a measure of the size of an invention. Schankerman (1997, 1999) show, however, that this indicator is related to the probability of litigation but not to the probability of being renewed.
The indicator based on non-patent citations (NPC), or citations to the scientific literature, has not been used extensively so far. Meyer (2000) underlines how important scientific tacit knowledge is to inventive activity in certain fields. However, the author argues that nonpatent citations hardly represent a direct link between cited paper and citing patent. Experimental results vary in this respect. Analysing a set of German patents applied for in 1977 and fully renewed until 1995 , Harhoff et al. (2003 establish a significant positive impact of scientific citations on the patents' monetary value. Harhoff and Reitzig (2002) , investigating patents filed in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical fields, observe a non significant influence of the number of non-patent citations on the probability that a patent will be opposed (considered a value indicator).
In a nutshell, it clearly appears from the literature survey that the number of forward patent citations is one of the most important determinants of patent value. It is closely followed by family size and backward patent citations. The scope of an invention has an ambiguous impact, whereas non-patent citations received little empirical support. The next section presents new and more detailed indicators that might improve our understanding of what determines patent value.
New indicators of patent value
The central hypothesis that we put forward is that a more precise definition of the components of the existing value determinants might improve our understanding of how patent value is determined. Most indicators reflect a broad source of knowledge, to some extent, non patent citations are deemed to approximate the scientific base of an invention; backward patent citations reflect the codified origin of the technological knowledge used for an invention; the co-assignees indicator measures the extent to which different sources of tacit knowledge have been merged into a single research project; and patent family size witnesses the financial resources used to extend the intellectual property abroad.
Figure 1 illustrates how these four indicators might be improved through a more precise 'institutional' typology. If these indicators broadly reflect the sources of knowledge that have been used to invent a patent, they might be improved through a formal identification of their institutional origins. Similarly, the number of countries chosen for the international protection phase can be disaggregated into strategic geographical choices.
*** Insert figure 1 around here ***
Scientific Knowledge (non-patent citations)
The scientific sources of knowledge, or non-patent citations, have been little investigated in the literature, and no conclusive result has emerged. An important distinction can be made between self and non-self citations to the scientific literature (see the Eastern quadrant of figure 1). Self citations to the scientific literature witness an invention that is based on the researcher's (or the research team's) own scientific and tacit knowledge. Non-self citations would have a lower potential impact on the value of an invention for two main reasons. First, it is a citation that is available to all inventors and is therefore open to worldwide competition (scientific publications are in the public domain). Self citations also refer to the public domain but are implicitly associated with a large potential tacit knowledge characterized by a substantial -and recognised -experience in the field of research. It can be assumed that an inventor who uses his or her own tacit knowledge (part of which has been published) is more likely to translate it into a successful invention. Second, it is well known that a substantial proportion of citations is imposed by patent examiners. These citations, although indubitably related to the field of research, would not have any, or at most very little, direct influence on the quality and hence the value of an invention. Self citations would always appear in patents (few scientists or researchers would forget to cite their own work), without any intervention from a third party.
Technological Knowledge (backward patent citations)
Backward patent citations (the Western Quadrant of figure 1 ), or the technological source of knowledge, have been validated as an indicator of patent value. The inventions that cite backward inventions are either architectural (i.e., merging different technologies) or incremental (improving an existing invention). In the former case, one can expect a higher value of the invention. In the latter it depends on the incremental step. A small increment would probably be associated with a lower return (and less forward citations) than a large increment. The only information that differentiates cited inventions relates to their institutional origins. A cited patent can be applied for by a public research institution (the invention comes from the scientific community), by a private firm (the invention comes from an invention that might be exploited by a firm), or by the research team itself (self backward citations).
The relationship between these three institutional sources of technological knowledge and the quality or value of an invention (whether incremental or architectural) is far from being clearcut, a priori. It can be expected, however, that patents that cite other patents invented by public research institutions (PRI) are more related to the scientific field and face less potential competition on the final product market than cited patents that have been applied for by a firm (the business sector using patents for exploitation or licensing purposes). Implicitly, self backward citations would relate more to incremental inventions and would in turn be associated with a lower potential value than architectural inventions.
Cooperation (co-applications of patents)
In the literature, the number of co-assignees (Southern quadrant of figure 1) has been little investigated as a determinant of patent value. Nevertheless, it either reflects an active research collaboration and/or contractual research and/or an independent research project, but whose intellectual property has been applied for by one of the co-assignees in order to commercialize or license the invention. Co-assignees can be firms or public research institutions. The former would witness either an active collaboration in research or contractual research. The potential effect of these co-assignees is unclear. If it is purely contractual research for the development of an invention, one might expect a lower potential value (otherwise the research project would be implemented by the firm to avoid any potential knowledge leakages). On the other hand, if it is performed under a collaborative framework, where two knowledge bases and research skills are merged, one might expect a higher impact on the value of the invention. If the co-assignee is a public research institution, a higher potential value can be expected, as the knowledge base of the invention would be related to greater research efforts from the scientific sector.
Patent Protection Strategy (or patent family)
The fourth indicator of patent value is the geographic scope of protection, or family size (Northern quadrant in figure 1 ). This indicator suggests that a patent that has been applied for in several countries is associated with a much higher value than a patent applied for in only one country or region. However, countries differ markedly in terms of both size and technological intensity. It might therefore be expected that a patent extended to the US (by non US applicants), for instance, is more valuable than a patent applied for only to the Australian market. From a European viewpoint, this assumption can be tested by simply looking at the patents that have been applied in the United States and/or Japan, by far the largest 'homogenous' markets in the world.
The Database on academic patents
Since 1985, Belgian universities have been increasingly concerned by the protection of their intellectual property. To assess this evolution, patent data have been collected in July 2002 through the DELPHION online database. In a first stage, the patents applied for by the 19 Belgian universities or university faculty centres 2 were gathered. In a second stage the focus was brought to the six most productive universities in terms of patent applications. 3 The database does not include patents that were invented within universities but applied for by third parties. 4 The patents were grouped in families. A patent family is the set of patents characterised by the same priority number. To take into account only the potentially most valuable patents, we focused on patent families with at least one patent application at the EPO (European Patent Office). This selection criterion was preferred to the analogue choice of having at least one patent application at the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office). This choice was made considering that EPO applications give a more complete picture of the patenting behaviour of Belgian universities.
The six most active (in terms of patent applications) Belgian universities (KUL, UG, VUB, UCL, ULB, Ulg) applied for 208 patent families (with a priority date ranging from 1985 to 1999) at the EPO. Among these, 78 EPO patents were also applied for at the USPTO. Only seven other patents were applied for at USPTO without being applied for at the EPO. The period of investigation concerns the priority dates going from 1985 to 1999. This selection is due to the patenting process and the constraints of data collection. The choice of the upper bound (1999) can be explained by two factors. First, there is a delay between the reporting date of the application in a database and the application date at a patent office. Second, the PCT (Patent Co-operation Treaty) procedure is increasingly used by firms and universities. This procedure allows the decision to internationally extend the rights of the patent to be delayed (delay of 30 months after the priority date). Therefore, as far as this paper focuses on patent applications at the EPO, the extension of the date filed after 1999 creates the risk of missing patents that are not primarily applied for at EPO but whose protection rights could be extended to the EPO at the end of the PCT procedure. Before 1985, the patenting activities of the Belgian universities were limited, as only 9 patents were applied for at the EPO (5 by UCL, 1 by Ulg and 3 by KUL).
In what follows, unless specified, the use of the term "patent" will refer to a patent family whose priority date is between 1985 and 1999 and with one member (at least) applied for at the EPO. Table 3 presents the number of patent applications of the six Belgian universities over three 5-year sub-periods; the late eighties, the early nineties and the late nineties; and for the entire period ranging from 1985 to 1999. *** Insert table 3 around here *** There has been a spectacular growth of patent applications by Belgian universities. An increase of 44% occurred between the late eighties (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) and the early nineties (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . This increase was followed by a growth of 264% between the early and the late nineties (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . This trend has continued since 1999. The University of Brussels (ULB), for instance, applied for more than 30 patents since the year 2000, a number larger than the number of patents applied for over the 15 preceding years. *** Insert table 4 around here *** Table 4 shows the number of forward patent citations received by patents applied between 1985 and 1999. It shows that KUL is currently the university with the highest number of patents and the highest average patent quality. Conversely, the 5-FPC index shows that patents at KUL are cited less rapidly on average than those of other universities. 5 It is clear that the average FPC is higher for universities that started to patent their inventions earlier.
*** Insert figure 2 around here *** Figure 2 shows that the well-known skewed distribution of patent value also holds for academic patents. Considering that value can be approximated by the number of forward patent citations, figure 2 shows that out of the 208 patent families included in the dataset, about 140 were not referenced by any subsequent patent, whereas two received more than 30 forward patent citations. The next section presents the econometric model that aims to explain this skewed value distribution of patents.
Empirical implementation
Two main equations are to be used in order to evaluate the value determinants of academic patents. The first one includes the 'traditional' determinants and the second one decomposes each traditional determinant into its 'new' institutional components. We use the number of forward patent citations as a proxy for the economic value of patents.
The highly skewed nature of the dependent variable requires a negative binomial model (count model). A negative binomial distribution is used because of the overdispersion of the data.
6 Individual units y i follow a Poisson regression model (with parameter i ) with an omitted variable u i such that exp(u i ) follows a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance .
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where i is the vector of parameters associated with the vector of explanatory variables x i. Alpha ( ) is the overdispersion parameter.
The dependent variable of our models is the number of forward patent citations (FPC) received from patents applied in any patent office. This number was not limited to the amount of forward citations received within the five years following the priority date because the delay between the priority date of the university patent and the filing date of the first patent citing the university was of about 6 years on average.
The basic econometric model is described in equation (1) : Equation (1) corresponds to the median specification used in the literature (summarized in table 2) and includes four types of variables. The first ones are control variables (CV). They take into account the characteristics of the patent (the number of inventors and whether it is applied in the biotech sector or not). The second type of variables is composed of the value determinants (VD). They are composed of non-patent citations, backward patent citations, the number of co-assignees and the family size. The third type of variable is composed of the six main universities' fixed effects (UNIV). The universities might indeed have different endowments and processes to manage knowledge transfer. The estimates also aim to test whether, taking into account the control variables and the value determinants, a significant university effect appears. The fourth type of variable is linked to the age of the patent. It is composed of time dummies. INV (the number of inventors involved in the patent) and BIO (whether the patent is in the biotech sector). VD j holds for j=1 to 4: FAM (the family size), BPC (backward patent citations), NPC (non patent citations), and COAS (the number of co-assignees). UNIV k holds for k=1 to 6 (the six universities included in the present analysis are UCL, ULB, Ulg, KUL, UG, VUB; cf. table A.1 in the appendix). YEAR l is the matrix of time dummies related to the priority dates of the patent (year of first filing), which ranges from 1985 to 1999. 
Control variables (CV)
INV is the number of inventors listed in the patent. The second control variable is BIO. The 208 patent families were divided into two broad technological fields: biotech and nonbiotech.
8 On average, the patents applied for in biotechnology are associated with higher citation rates than in other technological fields. The control variable BIO takes the value of one when the patent's technological field is the biotech sector, zero otherwise.
Value determinants (VD)
The extent to which a patent is partly or fully based on scientific knowledge can be approximated with the number of non-patent citations (NPC). In order to assess the origin of the science-base cited in the patent, the NPC variable can be disaggregated into two variables, as suggested in section 3: a dummy that reports whether the inventors' scientific papers (at least one) have been cited in the patent (self non-patent citations) and a variable for the number of citations to scientific papers written by other scientists (non-self non-patent citations).
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The second traditional value determinant is the number of backward patent citations (BPC). This variable can be disaggregated according to the institutional origin of cited patents. They have been clustered into three categories: the number of corporate applicants (firms or corporate R&D centres), the number of public institutional applicants (universities, hospitals, public research centres, state departments) and the number of self citations (citations to previous own inventions). The basic idea with this second approach is to test to what extent the quality and value of academic patents can be affected by the invention's institutional origin. Table A2 in the appendix shows that a majority of the applicants of the backward patent citations are firms (56%). A non-negligible proportion are self-citations to the inventors' own previous patents (7%), whereas 28% of the BPC are made to patents invented in public institutions.
To assess the impact of collaboration with other knowledge generating institutions, the number of co-assignees applying with a university was computed (COAS). Only juridical entities were looked at. In a second stage these co-applicants were disaggregated into two categories: the corporate co-assignees (industries, corporate R&D centres) and the public coassignees (public institutions such as universities, hospitals, public research centres and state departments).
The last 'traditional' determinant of patent value is the family size (FAM). It is one of the most relevant indicators of patent value. The variable takes into account the number of patents that are a member of the family. The alternative approach put forward in the present paper is to disaggregate this information and to focus on two variables describing whether the patents have also been applied for at the JPO and/or at the USPTO. These dummy variables take the value of one if applicable, zero otherwise.
Time variables (YEAR)
Patents are not cited immediately after their filing. The older a patent is, the more forward patent citations it might receive. This time effect is taken into account through a set of time dummies that correspond to the priority year of each patent. It is expected that younger patents receive proportionally less citations than older ones.
Empirical results
The estimation strategy is the first to estimate equation (1) with the traditional explanatory variables. In a second stage, all value determinants are disaggregated into their various institutional components, as described in section 3 and figure 1. 9 The available information in the database creates a potential bias: the self non-patent citations are underestimated and non-self non-patent citations are overestimated. Only partial information is available, because only the name of the first author is referenced in the database. These two variables may be more relevantly seen as the number of citations to the scientific literature for which one of the inventors is the principal author and as the number of references to papers for which none of the inventors is the first author. In health, life and engineering sciences, the first author of a scientific paper is usually the main researcher involved in the research described by the paper. Table 5 presents the econometric results of the two models. The dependent variable is the total number of forward patent citations received by each patent. Model 1 relies on a set of twenty-six explanatory variables. It includes the two control variables, the four traditional value determinants, the six universities' fixed effects and fourteen time dummies (1985 to 1999) . The subsequent model aims to improve the first model through a more detailed approximation of the institutional sources of knowledge (NPC, BPC and COAS) and of the patenting strategy regarding the geographic scope for protection.
The estimates of Model 1, with the traditional value determinants, yield the following results. The number of inventors (INV) has a negative impact on patent value, contrary to the conclusions of van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) . This difference might be due to the fact that they use all patents applications at EPO (i.e., mainly corporate patents), whereas this paper focuses exclusively on academic patents, which are generally invented by several researchers. The second control variable, BIO, has a positive and slightly significant (at a 14% probability threshold) impact on the patent value indicator. Biotech patents seem to be less significantly associated with forward patent citations than expected. *** Insert table 5 around here *** Amongst the value determinants, the number of backward patent citations and the number of co-assignees have a positive and highly significant impact on the value indicator. Non-patent citations (NPC) have no significant impact. This non significant result regarding references to the scientific literature differs from the results of Harhoff et al. (2003) . This is most probably due to the fact that all academic patents have a strong tendency to rely on the scientific literature. The simple count of non-patent citations would therefore not allow to identify the academic patents with the highest value indicator. University inventions are supposed to translate into more science-related patents than in the data set of Harhoff et al. (2003) , which is mainly composed of patents applied for by German business firms. This hypothesis is validated by the results of Harhoff and Reitzig (2002) , who focus on biotech and pharmaceutical patents and observe a non-significant impact of non-patent citations on their value indicator.
The parameter associated with family size is positive, but not significant. This is rather unexpected if we compare our results to the existing literature. The explanation might again be related to the fact that our database is composed exclusively of academic patents. Universities have fewer resources for patenting applications than do large corporations. The propensity to patent is probably lower, with a selection of inventions with a high expected value.
Model 2 advocates for the relevance of identifying the institutional components of the traditional determinants of patent value. The estimated overdispersion parameter (alpha) shows that model 2 explains a substantial part of overdispersion, as it decreases significantly from model 1 to model 2. To not account for the characteristics of knowledge sources is to leave some of the overdispersion unaccounted for (as compared to a Poisson dispersion). Moreover, as most of the patents bear little or no value, to explain dispersion is to explain dispersion on the right-hand side of the distribution, where the strategic and monetary value of a patent lies.
The estimated parameters of model 2 suggest that the issue that matters is not the total number of non-patent citations, but rather their origin. If a patent relies on at least one scientific paper authored by the inventors, it is more likely to be cited (the parameter is significant at a 13% probability threshold), whereas non-self citations to the scientific literature are associated with a negative and highly significant parameter. In other words, the universities' most valuable patents are those for which the inventors master the related science-base (as witnessed by their own publications) and decide to crystallize their tacit knowledge into technological inventions.
A second important determinant of patent value is backward patent citations. In Model 1 it positively correlates with patent value. Model 2 further investigates the mechanism through which backward citations affect value, by looking at the institutional origin of the cited patents. As suggested in the new methodological framework depicted in figure 1, disaggregated information on backward citations allows for a better understanding of the influence of their effect on patent value.
The estimates clearly show that patents citing patents invented by at least one similar researcher (citations to self) are significantly less cited. The explanation might be that self backward patent citations witness mainly an incremental invention rather than a breakthrough invention. When the cited patents are invented by public institutions, they are a significant and positive determinant of patent value, whereas backward patent citations to corporate patents have no impact. These results validate our expectations; patents that cite other patents invented by public research institutions are more related to scientific research and face less potential competition on the final product market than cited patents that have been applied for by a firm.
Model 1 also illustrates the positive impact of co-assignees on the number of forward patent citations. Model 2 shows that academic patents co-applied with public institutions are more likely to be cited.
11 Co-assignation with a firm is associated with a positive but weakly significant (at a 13% probability threshold) impact on forward patent citations. On the one hand, co-assignation with a private firm might not reveal scientific co-operation but only the commitments of a research contract sharing the ownership of intellectual rights between the university (the research partner) and the industry (the financial partner). On the other hand, it can be assumed that private partners are more aware of the financial value hidden behind an invention. In this case, and if a disequilibrium occurs between corporate and academic bargaining powers, one can assume that industry would try to keep full ownership of the patent and the latter would not appear in our database (the university would not appear as an applicant). This hypothesis might explain why collaboration with industry seems to be less fruitful than academic collaboration.
The fourth indicator of patent value relates to family size. Model 1 shows that patent family size is not an important determinant of patent value. However, as argued in section three, some 'members' of a family might provide a more precise approximation of patent value. This idea is validated by Model 2, which shows that an application at the JPO and/or at the USPTO has a positive and significant impact on the probability of a patent to be referenced by a subsequent one; especially applications at the USPTO, which is one of the most relevant predictors of patent value (at least for Belgian academic inventions). This result is consistent with that obtained by van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) . They found that amongst all patent applications at EPO, those that had a sound geographic strategy (the designation of certain European countries for protection) had a significantly higher probability to be granted.
In order to test for the robustness of the estimates presented in table 5, several regressions of models 1 and 2 were performed with only five universities in the sample (dropping one university each time). The estimated parameters were stable and similar to those presented in table 5.
Since self backward citations have a negative and significant impact on the number of forward citations a patent receives, one could logically wonder whether the dependent variable should be cleaned of 'self' forward citations. Indeed, many inventors might prefer to see their inventions cited more by other inventors than by themselves. To test whether relying on the number of self FPC would affect empirical results, similar models were run with the total number of non-self forward patent citations (instead of total FPC) as a dependent variable. The estimates of models 1 and 2 are stable (all the parameters have the same sign and significance), and the conclusions stay basically the same.
One might also wonder whether the recent growth in patent applications by Belgian universities witnesses a surge in innovative activity, or whether it merely reflects a higher propensity to patent innovations of lower quality or value. In the USA, Henderson et al. (1995 Henderson et al. ( , 1998 show that patenting by universities has risen dramatically in the last 25 years and that this increase is clearly associated with an overall increase in university attention to commercial applications of technology. However, they also notice that "despite the approximate doubling in the total number of patents after 1980 [Bayh-Dole Act] , there is no increase in the number of very important patents" [Henderson et al., 1995, p23] and suggest that "their results could reflect either a change in the internal research culture of the US universities that makes scientists and engineers get involved in more applied research with less significant patents or the effects of entry into patenting after 1980 by institutions with little experience and expertise in patenting". [Mowery et al, 2002b, p74] These last conclusions are, however, criticized by Mowery et al. ( , 2002a Mowery et al. ( , 2002b and Sampat et al. (2003) . They argue that there is a truncation bias in Henderson's data and observe that universities with substantial pre-1980 patenting experience display no decline in importance and generality of their patents after 1980. They conclude that "any changes in the characteristics of the U.S. university patents after 1980 are due in large part to entry, rather than to changes in university culture." [Mowery et al., 2002b, p73] They also stress that university patenting experience and learning aspects are key elements for applying for important patents.
The university fixed effects presented in model 2 of table 5 seem to confirm this latter argument. For instance, the university that has had the largest increase -as well as the oldest history -in patenting activity is the KUL. The KUL's fixed effect is in an intermediate position not significantly different from those of the other five universities. We cannot conclude, therefore, that the recent surge in patenting activity by Belgian universities witnesses a higher propensity to patent inventions of lower value. It would rather suggest that it reflects a higher propensity to patent inventions of high potential value.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we put forward new potential determinants of patent value and test their impact empirically. The major improvement on 'traditional' indicators consists in a detailed identification of the institutional sources of the knowledge embodied in the patented inventions of six Belgian universities.
The scientific knowledge base of an invention, approximated by the number of non-patent citations, can be disentangled into self and non-self citations to scientific literature. The technological knowledge, usually approximated by the number of backward patent citations, can be decomposed into the institutional origins of the cited patents (public research institution, corporate research and self citations). Potential collaboration between different institutions can be decomposed into types of collaborative institutions. Finally, an alternative to the family size of a patent can be approximated by taking into account some of the largest 'homogenous' markets targeted for protection, such as the United States and Japan (from a European viewpoint).
The patent value indicator used for the empirical analysis is approximated by the number of forward patent citations. The estimates show that, controlling for its age and its technological field, the most important value determinant of an academic patent is its number of backward patent citations. As far as academic patents are concerned, the presence of a co-assignee also seems to improve the patent value. This is probably due to an effective collaboration or an improved selection process. Another specificity of academic patents is that the total number of non-patent citations does not seem to be a patent value indicator. This last result might be due to the fact that most academic patents have a strong propensity to cite the scientific literature.
However, when traditional indicators are disentangled according to their institutional origin, a more accurate understanding of what determines the value of patents appears. It is not so much the number of non-patent citations that matters, but whose work the patent is using. Self citations (the fact that the patent cites scientific papers whose first author is one of the inventors) are a positive and significant indicator of patent value, as opposed to non-self citations. In other words, some of the universities' most valuable patents are those for which the inventors attempt to crystallize their tacit knowledge into technological inventions.
Similarly, it is not the number of backward citations that matters, but what type of institution the patent cites. Self backward patent citations indicate a lower patent value, which is probably due to the fact that these patents witness mainly an incremental invention.
Academic patents that are co-applied for with another institution are more likely to be cited. However, it is not the number of co-assignees that matters but the mix of institutions the patent cites. Being involved in the co-application of a patent with a public research institution has the most significant and positive impact on the number of forward citations. This might be the result of active collaboration between public institutions that have a strong knowledge base.
Similarly, it is not the number of family members that matters, but to where one expands geographic protection. In this respect, extending the patent to the US or to Japan is a good indicator of patent value, especially to the US which is by far the largest homogeneous market for technology.
Further research is required to evaluate whether the new indicators proposed in this paper are also valid for corporate patent applications. However, two clear policy implications regarding academic research emerge from our results. The first one is related to the positive impact of self citations to scientific literature. It clearly shows that when a patent is invented by a researcher who uses his own scientific and tacit knowledge, one may expect a potentially higher economic value. That is, the current policies aiming at fostering knowledge transfer from universities to industry should try to stimulate academic researchers with a high scientific profile in terms of publications. Second, the academic patents emerging from a collaboration with public research organisations are associated with a significantly higher value than the other academic patents. This result validates the current Belgian Federal S&T policy that consists in fostering institutional collaboration (as well as the 6 th Framework Programme implemented by the EC Directorate General for Research at the EU-wide level). N  F21V  N  A01K  B  C04B  N  G01B  N  A01M  B  C07B  B  G01F  B  A23K  B  C07C  B  G01J  N  A23L  B  C07D  B  G01L  N  A61B  B  C07F  B 
Appendices
N * B : biotechnology field; N: non biotechnology field ** The IPC class G01N is a class linked to instrumentation apparatus related to the investigation or the analysis of materials by determining their chemical or physical properties. We have considered here that the patent within this classification could be a biotech patent or not. To determine in which field it should occur. We have looked at the others listed IPC codes. If they were biotechnology classes (as defined in the table). the patent was considered to be applied in the biotech field. Otherwise. the patent was considered to be a non biotech patent. variables like the importance of the patent for current and future technical developments; the difficulty to invent around the patent and to prove its infringement; the learning value for competitors, the number of competitor and the fact that the patent is the basis for other ones.
These variables have been evaluated by experts on Likert scales. 1. The sign between parentheses indicates the expected relative impact of each characteristic associated with the main indicator (relative to the average impact of the main indicator). PRI = public research institution. ULg  KUL  UG  VUB  TOTAL  1985-1989  9  3  0  14  1  0  27  1990-1994  7  7  2  18  3 2 39 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 9 1 4 1 8 1 3 5 5 2 5 1 7 1 4 2 1 9 8 5 -1 9 9 9 3 0 2 8 1 5 8 7 2 9 1 9 2 0 8 1. Sources: Delphion website and own calculations. Levels of significance (probability threshold):° <15%; * < 10%; ** <5% ; *** < 1% Number of observations: 208 patent families applied between 1985-1999 at EPO. The two models include 14 time dummies.
